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Turkish Foreign Policy: An Overview  
During the years of the Cold War, the study of Turkey’s foreign policy hardly 
generated interest in the international arena.  This was neither unique nor 
surprising. In a highly polarized environment, the members of each camp had 
to subscribe, in the final analysis, to the preferences of the superpower who led 
it and who provided for their nuclear defense. Turkey, it may be noted, was 
more observant of the expectations of the US who led the Western Bloc than 
some other members for two reasons. First, Turkey had long land and sea 
borders with the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact such as 
Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, it was in possession of the Bosporus and 
the Dardanelles, briefly referred to as the Turkish Straits, a narrow waterway 
controlling access of the Soviets to the Mediterranean. Hence, it saw itself as  a 
front line state with more intense security concerns  than many other members 
of the alliance. These concerns were intensified by dependence on allies, 
naturally headed by the US, for the provision of arms to maintain a credible 
military. Second, as a country with a poorly developed economy that had opted 
for import substitution oriented industrialization, Turkey relied on its more 
prosperous allies to come to its assistance in order to cope with the periodic 
crises Turkey’s economy encountered since its external earnings often failed to 
meet its import needs. When balance of payments difficulties emerged, 
arguments emphasizing Turkey’s indispensible contribution to the security of 
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the Western Bloc were usually mobilized to ask the allies to help the Turkish 
economy to regain its health.  
 The conditions under which Turkish foreign policy was made began to 
change after 1980. Particularly after the oil crisis of 1973, it became 
increasingly difficult to sustain the policy of import substitution oriented 
indistrialization. Such a policy required large and continual inflow of loans and 
grants  from abroad which were not  forthcoming. As a result, Turkey had to 
bring about a major shift in its economic policy to increase its external earnings. 
Change came in January 1980 in the form of doing away with the complex of 
reGülations that had come to be referred to as “Rules and ReGülations for the 
Protection of the Value of the Turkish Lira.” This step was no more than 
liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, making it attractive for Turkish 
industries to export. Quickly, Turkish industrial exports began to increase and 
the Turkish economy began to become integrated to the world economic 
system.  
 Becoming more reliant on exports for the prosperity of its own economy 
constituted the background condition against which a process of gradual change 
in Turkish foreign policy was initiated. In contrast to earlier times when 
maximizing military and economic assistance from its allies was the major 
concern of Turkey’s policymakers, finding new markets and forging new 
relationships in which economic factors prevailed became the order of the day. 
These efforts were clearly facilitated initially by the thawing in the East-West 
relations and then the end of the Cold War marked by the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact and then the demise of the Soviet Union.  
 In retrospect, the change of Turkey’s economic policy appears to have 
been well timed. The painful process of Turkey’s integration to the international 
economy had already advanced to a certain level by the time the Cold War 
ended such that Turkey could retain a functioning economy without any longer 
having to resort to “contribution to western security” arguments whose powers 
of persuasion had rapidly declined.  Furthermore, under the widely transformed 
political and security environment, previously existing barriers to engaging in 
trade with former “adversaries” had now been removed. Turkey’s economic 
relations with Russia and the countries of the Former Soviet Union rapidly 
expanded as well as those with countries of the Middle East while the country 
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continued its efforts to find new markets in Africa, East Asia and even Latin 
America. 
 
 
Background to Departure from Traditional Foreign Policy 
Despite a rapidly changing environment, initial changes in Turkish foreign 
policy were modest, reflecting the cautious approach that had characterized 
Turkey’s diplomacy under the republic. After its founding in the heartland of 
the Ottoman Empire, The republican governments had initially pursued a 
policy of neutrality and balancing pressures of the major European powers on 
the country. Such a policy enabled Turkey to stay out of the Second World 
War. The rapid rise of the bipolar world after the Second World War produced 
an equally rapid response when Turkey chose to associate itself with the 
Western Bloc and pursued efforts that led to its becoming a member of NATO. 
This was a manifestation of a more general approach that guided post-war 
Turkish foreign policy: do not stay out of the major institutional developments 
in the Western World. Accordingly, Turkey joined the Council of Europe, the 
OEEC (later OECD) and sought immediate association with the European 
Economic Community (later the European Union) when it was established. 
Finally, when Turkey’s economy came to rely on export-oriented growth and 
later when the Cold War came to an end, there was a gradual broadening of 
relations with others while maintaining close ties with both the US and Western 
Europe. 
 In this context, the rise of the Justice and Development party (AKP) to 
power in 2002 was initially met with concern that this party which represented 
a more religious orientation than other parties in Turkish politics might depart 
in major ways from the main direction of Turkish foreign policy. Such concerns 
were prompted, among others, by the behavior of the pre-2002 Felicity Party 
and its predecessors that had worked with limited success to move Turkey from 
the Western Bloc to a yet non-existent Islamic Bloc, in the construction of 
which Turkey would presumably play a leading role. 
The refusal in 2003 of the Turkish parliament to allow US troops to go 
through Turkey in their plans to invade Iraq might have been seen as evidence 
of a major departure. Yet, the incident did not constitute the watershed event 
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marking a clear departure point from Turkey’s foreign policy. The government, 
it is to be remembered, had undertaken to secure the parliament’s approval for 
such passage and managed to achieve a parliamentary majority, but the 
procedure failed by one vote in view of some defections that the government 
was unable to control. Both sides tried to mend fences afterwards. Furthermore, 
in 2004, after much hesitation deriving from what Turkey might be asked to 
concede on Cyprus, the AKP government accepted EU’s invitation to 
commence with accession negotiations, a process that began in 2005.  
 The event marking Turkey’s beginning to act more independently in 
foreign policy came much later (2010) in the form of voting along with Brazil in 
the UN Security Council regarding the adoption of sanctions against Iran for its 
failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This had 
been preceded by two months by a major confrontation with Israel, America’s 
major ally in the Middle East, over the shipment of humanitarian aid to Gaza. 
The incident marked the beginning of the deterioration of relations with Israel 
that continues today. What were the circumstances that promoted the shift in 
foreign policy, directing it to unusual activism uncharacteristic of earlier times 
and why? 
 
 
Structure and Agent in the Making of Foreign Policy 
Those analyzing foreign policy usually turn to one of two types of explanations 
commonly known as structure-based and agent based, to explain what is done 
and why . Those that are structure-based refer to the conditions that generate 
pressures for change such as shifts in the relative power of other states, major 
developments in technology, and considerations of economic need and 
advantage. The second, i.e. agent-based explanations, on the other hand, focus 
on the ideas, ideologies, cognitive maps and also the psychologies of 
policymakers as sources of explaining policy shifts. It is reasonable to argue 
that a comprehensive analysis would have to incorporate both modes, although 
it is clear that a shift in only one of the domains may also produce changes. 
More likely is a situation, however, in which both structural and agent based 
forces are at work.  
 In the preceding description of the evolution and changes in Turkish 
foreign policy, the explanation has relied on structural elements. It has been 
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argued that the post WWII order directed Turkey to side with the Western 
Bloc and that change in the Turkish economy and the end of the Cold War were 
important in initiating change during the last two decades of the last century.  
Prior to the emergence of more independent activism in foreign policy, two 
additional developments of a structural nature also occurred. First, in 2002, the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an overwhelming victory in the 
national elections, ending a prolonged period beginning in 1991 during which 
Turkey had been ruled by unwieldy coalition governments. These governments, 
characterized by major internal rifts were, for the most part, incapable of 
producing often even minor policy decisions, external affairs not excepted.  
With the subsequent victory of the AKP in the elections of 2007 and 2011, 
Turkey entered a period of governmental stability which made it easier for the 
government to formulate and implement changes in foreign policy. Second, 
after going through a major economic crisis in 1999-2001 during which major 
institutional reforms and policies were introduced to prevent a recurrence, the 
Turkish economy entered a period of sustained economic growth that continues 
to this day. Such growth not only reduced the reliance of the prosperity of the 
Turkish economy to support from other friendly countries in order to overcome 
its difficulties but also generated resources that could be used in the 
implementation of foreign policy. That fact that Turkish economic and 
humanitarian assistance to Somalia tops that of any other country is a case in 
point. 
 Now, let us introduce the agents into our analysis.  After the victory of 
the AKP in 2002, Turkish foreign policy was initially guided by Abdullah Gül, 
the current president of Turkey, who was first the prime minister until the legal 
hurdles could be cleared for the election of Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of AKP, 
to join the parliament by winning a by-election and become the prime minister. 
After the ascent of the latter to the premiership, Mr. Gül assumed the command 
of Turkish foreign policy. Mr. Gül continued the cautious change tradition in 
Turkish foreign policy. He was the foreign minister when Turkey was invited to 
become a member of the European Union. 
Mr. Gül left the foreign ministry in 2004. Since that time, Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu has been a critical figure in the shaping of Turkish foreign policy. 
Currently the foreign minister, he did not actually assume that position until 
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2009. Serving as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister, however, 
his determining input into the making and implementation of Turkish foreign 
policy is widely acknowledged. His role appears to have been enhanced 
particularly after the elections of 2007, and reinforced with his becoming the 
foreign minister in 2009 and then his election to the parliament in the 2011 
elections underscoring a major victory for the AKP.  
 Coming from an academic background, the essence of Mr. Davutoğlu’s 
thinking is expressed in a book he wrote in 2001 entitled Strategic Depth. The 
book identifies geography, history, culture and the Turkish economy as 
elements that make Turkey a candidate for regional leadership.  Turkey can 
build a zone of stability and prosperity by helping solve regional problems. The 
book defines a framework or a broad goal for Turkish foreign policy but does 
not prescribe specific courses of action. Over time, it has constituted the source 
of inspiration for the challenging goal of “zero problems with neighbors,” 
another idea of the foreign minister. 
 It seems that Mr. Davutoğlu, judging that the power balances in the 
world was shifting and that Turkey’s fortunes were on the rise, set out develop a 
greater say in world governance as well as to strengthen Turkey’s claim to 
regional leadership. With regard to his first goal, his line of logic was reasonable. 
The system of world governance had been devised at the end of the Second 
World War and had failed to adjust to the realities of the contemporary world.  
This led him to turn to policies that tried to expand Turkey’s space for 
independent action in the world system and to cooperate with other countries 
that found themselves in a similar situation. With regard to his second goal, his 
aspirations were understandable. As claimant to regional leadership, Egypt was 
deeply embroiled in its own economic and political problems at the time. The 
other claimant, Iran, was not only unacceptable to the Western World but also 
too closely identified with the minority sect of Shia Islam for its leadership 
claims to be recognized by a majority of the regional states.  Furthermore, 
Turkey seemed to be highly popular on the Arab Street, demonstrating that a 
society with a majority Muslim population could be reasonably democratic and 
achieve economic prosperity.  
 Under Mr. Davutoğlu’s steermanship, three impulses have been 
important in the shaping of Turkish foreign policy: Remaining within the 
general framework of the Western alliance including the US and the EU; 
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challenging the global distribution of power and the global system of 
governance; and becoming the regional leader, peacemaker and the builder of a 
regional order. Each of these impulses has carried greater weight at different 
points in time and they have harbored contradictions that have caused tensions 
with allies, neighbors and rivals. Mr. Davutoğlu appears to have persuaded the 
Prime Minister that his line of thinking and the policies he recommended were 
sound and ought to be implemented. Therefore he has enjoyed the full support 
of  the Erdoğan government.  
 
 
Building up to Regional Leadership 
From 2004 until 2010, the particular way the three impulses were molded into 
policy involved cooperation with the Western World but expanding room for 
independent action, keeping sustained economic development on course, and 
achieving regional leadership by trying to broker good relations and peace 
between feuding parties in the region.  
 Maintaining good relations with the Western allies included both 
cooperating with the US and advancing relations with the EU. With the US, 
Turkey not only worked to help build a stable Iraq, but it also contributed non-
combat troops to the NATO operation in Afghanistan as well as in the Balkans. 
However, there were many sources of discord in the relationship. Kurdish 
terrorism directed to Turkey from bases in Northern Iraq was a constant source 
of irritation. The US discouraged Turkey from directing incursions into Iraq 
even if these might be in the nature of hot pursuit. It offered to give Turkey 
satellite based intelligence but the information provided was found to be not 
“actionable,” i.e. put to immediate use to capture or disable terrorists. It is only 
after much negotiation that the provision of more “actionable intelligence” 
began to flow. There were occasional unfriendly incidents between American 
military personnel involved in logistical activity in Turkey and Turkish soldiers 
as well as Turkish military delegations in Northern Iraq. 
 As regards the EU, the accession negotiations did not progress 
smoothly. Specifically, Turkey did not recognize Cyprus and open its ports to 
Cypriot vessels. Cyprus, in return, prevented several chapters from being 
opened in the accession negotiations. But there emerged a more general problem 
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of will on both sides, but first originating in the EU. It seems that the end of the 
Cold War and the expansion of the EU to include the countries of Eastern 
Europe radically transformed the conditions under which Turkey was seen to be 
an indispensible component of the EU. First, the security considerations that 
had figured heavily in the inclusion of Turkey in the future plans of the EU 
were no longer compelling. Second, there were concerns that it would be 
difficult for the EU to digest a very large and relatively poor country after a 
major wave of expansion that had already restrained its resources. Third, 
Turkey’s entry would clearly challenge the existing distribution of power in the 
EU that could best be characterized currently as a Franco-German 
condominium. This was probably one of the main motives behind the French 
objections to Turkish accession under Nicholas Sarkozy.  Finally, there was a 
general rise of cultural conservatism in Europe that conceptualized the EU as a 
Christian club that naturally excluded Turkey whose population is almost 
exclusively Moslem. The leadership of both France and Germany kept alluding 
to an undefined “special relationship” that would replace Turkey’s full 
membership in the Union. The change of heart in the EU dampened Turkey’s 
enthusiasm for membership since that appeared to be an increasingly elusive 
prospect. Strong economic ties with more than 50 percent of Turkey’s exports 
going to the EU (currently 34 percent and declining) and significant EU 
member investments in Turkey, however, helped prevent a serious rupture in 
the relationship. 
 While trying to maintain good ties with its traditional allies, the 2004-
2010 period was also a time when Turkey tried to expand its ties with other 
countries and regions of the world. Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with 
numerous new African countries, as well as forging new ties and strengthening 
existing ties with Latin American and Asian countries. This is a period during 
which Turkish embassies opened in new capitals, Turkish external aid agency 
TIKA assumed an activist posture in many an underdeveloped country and 
after an energetic campaign, Turkey was elected as a temporary member of the 
UN Security Council.  
  With regard to its neighboring region, Turkey adopted a facilitator role 
in enhancing better relations among the countries in the area. Within this 
framework, Turkey managed to get the Saudi’s and Syrians to talk to each 
other, help Iranians and Saudis to communicate, bring the feuding factions of 
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Palestinians together and most importantly came close to getting the Syrians 
and the Israelis reach an accommodation on the status of Golan heights. In all 
of these endeavors, Turkey managed to stand equidistant to all sides, acquire 
their trust and be recognized as an impartial neighbor in the region. 
 
 
Zero Problems with Neighbors 
Regarding its own problems with neighbors, a “zero problems with neighbors” 
approach was adopted.  Such an approach did not imply, as is sometimes 
suggested, that no problems would be left between Turkey and its neighbors, 
but rather that Turkey would work at settling its disputes with its neighbors 
through peaceful means rather than ignore them. Historically, Turkey had a 
highly problematical relationship with Syria that entertained claims on the 
Turkish province of Hatay and supported the Kurdish PKK terror to prevent 
Turkey from building dams on the Euphrates, fearing that Turkey would 
eventually use much of the water and not release sufficient quantities for Syria 
to meet its needs. This policy was changed by Hafez al Assad (the father) only 
after Turkey threatened to intervene militarily. Beginning in 1999, relations 
had started to improve, gaining new momentum after 2004. Syria went quiet on 
its claims to Hatay and its challenges regarding Turkey’s construction of dams 
on the Euphrates. One by one, border restrictions were removed, a project to 
clear the border region from mines was developed, visa requirements were lifted, 
trade began to expand rapidly, Turkish investments began to trickle in, and 
finally, a strategic partnership was announced. Turkish and Syrian ministers 
would hereafter hold periodic joint meetings. Relations appeared to have 
reached an ideal state that hardly any observer would have imagined as possible 
a few years ago. 
After the US intervention, relations with Iraq too seemed on the whole 
to develop in a satisfactory direction. Turkey was committed to maintaining the 
territorial integrity of Iraq and the evolution of a regime that would bring peace 
and stability to that country. Turkey had an interest in preventing the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in Iraq’s north which it judged 
might develop separatist linkages with Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish 
Southeast, a position that suited the government in Baghdad well. Turkey 
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looked forward to expanding economic relations in a market that generated 
sizable demands for goods and services. Furthermore, Turkey thought that it 
was a natural transport route for the oil and gas that Iraq would be exporting 
to the world markets. A pipeline from Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean 
port of Yumurtalik already existed and it could certainly be expanded.  
Turkey’s relations with Iran also improved during this period. Turkey 
expanded its economic relations with Iran and became a major customer of 
Iranian gas and oil. In contrast to western leaders that shunned from 
developing close relations with Iran, Turkey’s leaders were warm and receptive 
to their Iranian counterparts. Turkish foreign policy leadership tried to restrain 
western governments, especially the US in pursuing a non-compromising line 
against Iran, and argued for engagement and communication. Again Turkey 
saw Iran as a major economic partner and Turkish trade with Iran was 
constantly growing. Turkey also attracted a respectable number of Iranian 
tourists who found in Turkey a liberal society in which they could enjoy food 
and drink without having to worry about gender and dress codes.  It is to be 
remembered that the Turco-Iranian relationship has always harbored both 
competitive and cooperative elements. While the competitive elements did not 
disappear during the period in question, clearly a more cooperative mood 
characterized the relationship.  
Syria, Iraq and Iran all had bad relations with Israel. Turkey, on the 
other hand, had developed reasonably close relations with Israel despite its 
unhappiness regarding the latter’s failure to accommodate the aspirations of the 
Palestinians. Turkey viewed the Israeli relationship as being important for two 
reasons. First, Israel was a reliable partner in defense items which Turkey 
sometimes had difficulty getting from other allies including the US. 
Furthermore, military and non-military wares and technologies imported from 
Israel were cheaper than those acquired from Western partners. Second, Israel 
had a strong lobby in Congress whereas Turkey did not. This lobby often came 
to Turkey’s support on issues before the Congress where they constituted a 
counterweight to Armenian and Greek lobbies that displayed strong anti-
Turkish proclivities. In return, Israel was insured of the support of a 
moderating influence in regional politics and got access to using Turkish 
territory for air force training exercises. Trade between the two countries 
flourished and Turkey was a popular destination for Israeli tourists.   
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It is interesting to note that the Turkish government tried also to 
improve relations with Armenia. The Armenian state has insisted that Turkey 
should assume responsibility for the alleged genocide of Armenians in 1915 
under Ottoman rule. It also calls much of Eastern Turkey “western Armenia 
and which it judges to be rightful Armenian territory. Turkey rejects Armenian 
claims and argues that Armenia should withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh and 
several Azeri provinces that it occupied in a war with Azerbaijan. The Turkish-
Armenian conflict is of broader interest than just the bilateral relations since 
the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States, in addition to many 
other parts of the world, lobby governments to recognize the events of 1915 as 
genocide, an act which the Turks consider to be  inaccurate, unfair and 
downright insulting. The practical outcome is that Armenia and Turkey do not 
have diplomatic relations and the border is closed. 
Both the US and European allies encouraged the parties to settle their 
differences. A process of conciliation was initiated in September 2008 with the 
Turkish President Gül traveling to Armenia, ostensibly to attend a soccer game 
between two national teams in a European championship match which 
provided an opportunity for him to talk with the Armenian president. These 
initial acts were followed by the preparation of an agreement that involved the 
initiation of diplomatic relations and the opening of the border. The agreement 
was signed in Geneva in September 2009.The Turkish side believed that there 
was a tacit understanding that Armenia would begin to withdraw from some of 
the provinces of Azerbaijan that it was occupying, but this did not materialize. 
Azerbaijan with whom Turkey shares a common culture and language as well as 
substantial economic interests the most important of which the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline, protested vehemently, arguing that it had been betrayed. Under the 
circumstances neither Turkey nor Armenia felt ready to implement the 
agreement. A unique effort to terminate a state of hostile relations with a 
neighbor failed. 
A similar experiment also failed in Cyprus. In 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat 
got elected the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He 
represented a line of thinking that argued that it was possible to negotiate with 
the Greek side to bring about the unification of the Island. This change 
provided a window of opportunity for Turkey to address a problem that had 
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proven insoluble in the past. Bilateral negotiations, however, proved fruitless. 
The Greek Cypriot government not only felt that in the long run both Turkish 
Cyprus and Turkey would have to yield to their position because of Turkey’s 
interest in becoming a members of the EU, but it had also become enslaved in 
the hands of its own public whom Cypriot political parties had led to believe 
that it would be possible to unify the Island without making any concession to 
the Turks.  The negotiations under the auspices of the UN delivered little 
progress. The solution of the problem was therefore laid to rest.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s relations with Russia 
had grown rapidly. Freed from the adversarial perception produced by the 
bipolar global politics, there was a rapid expansion of economic relations. 
Russia became the major supplier of natural gas to Turkey while led 
construction services in Russia. Consumer goods from Turkey filled Russian 
shelves while Russian tourists filled hotel rooms on the Turkish Mediterranean 
coast. Relations were further facilitated by the personal chemistry between Mr. 
Putin and the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan. Eventually references 
to a strategic partnership (a loosely employed word by Turkish policymakers) 
began to be used to describe the relationship. Russia undertook to build 
Turkey’s first nuclear plant. Mainly through Turkish efforts, visa requirements 
for short term travel were removed between the two countries. 
From the very beginning, Turkey worked also to develop sound 
relations with the former Soviet states and broadly succeeded in this endeavor. 
Lively economic and/or cultural relations were established with the Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus. But these were understandably overshadowed by size 
and the significance of the Russian relationship. Turkey’s efforts to develop a 
special relationship with the Turkic speaking republics in Central Asia, on the 
other hand, have been reasonably successful but not advanced as much as 
Turkey has hoped for. The ruling elites, generally apparatchiks from the days of 
the USSR maintained a strong orientation toward Russia. Furthermore, 
economic dependencies developed during the Soviet times cannot be undone 
easily. Close relations, on the other hand, were established with Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. This has culminated in the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline and later a parallel natural gas line, both originating in Baku and going 
across Georgia into Turkey. Recently, it has been agreed to develop the gas 
pipeline into the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, intended to be the beginning leg of 
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system that will transport Azeri and possibly Kazakh and Turkmen gas into 
Europe, serving Turkey’s aspirations to become a global energy hub.   
Turning to Turkey’s West, although a number of unsettled issues 
connected with Aegean airspace, continental shelf, territorial waters and 
economic zone, Turkey’s relations with Greece were good. The two societies had 
learned to live with problems and did not allow them to undermine a peaceful 
relationship between them. Beyond Greece, in the Balkans, Turkey that hosts 
significant immigrant populations from Balkan countries, was active in 
contributing to peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts cooperating with the 
UN, NATO and the EU. It was also an economic actor that offered both 
economic assistance and conducted trade. It enjoyed the trust of contesting 
parties in the region and used this confidence to broker better relations even 
between the Serbs and the Bosnian Moslems.  
If one were to describe where Turkey stood in terms of its foreign policy 
in 2009, it may said that the country had been moving toward becoming a 
regional leader. It was perceived as an honest broker among countries of the 
Middle East and the Balkans, its economic performance and the ensuing 
prosperity impressed others; its secular, liberal atmosphere and democratic 
politics led publics of neighboring countries in its South to aspire to be like 
Turkey. For them, Turkey was a neighbor, but it belonged to a different world 
of more industrialized, more democratic countries of the west. More broadly, 
Turkey appeared to have succeeded in building a zone of prosperity around it, it 
was a trusted neighbor and an honest broker. It was an important economic 
partner. It was a country tourists from the region wanted to visit at their first 
opportunity. Hardly anyone would have predicted that this idyllic state of 
affairs would unravel in such a short time.  
 
 
Experiment in Going Independent 
What had happened, what had gone wrong? One incident appears to have had a 
clear contribution to triggering the change- the Israeli attack on Gaza in 
December 2008. The attack came a few days after the then Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak had returned to Israel from Turkey with a proposal to 
reach an accommodation with Syria on the status of Golan Heights. The 
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Turkish Prime Minister had invested time and effort to bring this about. The 
end of hostilities between Syria and Israel would have constituted a huge step in 
converting the Middle East into a zone of peace and hopefully prosperity. 
Turkey would be a leading political and economic beneficiary of this 
development. Ehud Barak had gone back to Israel, leaving the impression that 
he would put some finishing touches on the proposal and get cabinet approval. 
Instead came the attack on Gaza. Mr. Erdoğan felt betrayed and thought that 
he had been duped by Israel to gain time in preparing the attack on Gaza. 
It is probably after this incident that the prime minister concluded that 
Israel had no intention of making peace and it was out to take more territory 
from the Palestinians. He appears further to have judged that Israel’s 
recalcitrance derived from insufficiencies in the world system of governance 
which prevented international action to stop Israel. He began, ever more 
frequently, to utter critical remarks about Israel. He soon discovered that such 
talk made him very popular in the Arab streets since Arab leaders were 
generally more reserved in their remarks about Israel.  
Then in in May 2009, Mr. Davutoğlu became the foreign minister. 
Although he had been an influential foreign policy advisor to the prime 
minister, being made a minister, he was now at the helm of foreign policy. The 
prime minister showed great confidence in him, a fact that enhanced his input 
into policymaking. Whether his promotion to ministerial position reflected the 
prime minister’s desire to bring about changes in foreign policy or whether Mr. 
Davutoğlu formed policy and persuaded the prime minister that policy should 
be changed is difficult to establish, but it is clear that within a year Turkish 
foreign policy turned more independent and assertive. The landmark event, of 
course, is the negative vote that Turkey cast along with Brazil against the 
imposition of sanctions on Iran for failing to submit its nuclear program to the 
review of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although the US 
government may have led Brazil and Turkey to believe that the deal they 
brokered with Iran was acceptable to the Obama administration and that the 
US was in fact reneging on its promise, not abstaining but voting against an 
ally, was not received kindly by the Americans. Turkey accepted to observe the 
sanctions depicted in the decision of the UN Security Council but made clear 
that it would not observe additional measures that would be introduced by the 
US or the EU.  
Ilter Turan  
 
 
 137 
 
The UN vote was on June 9, 2010. This had been preceded a few days 
ago by an incident on the high seas in which Israeli commandoes had attacked 
Mavi Marmara, a boat carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza as the flagship of an 
international flotilla, killing eight Turks and one American of Turkish origin. 
There were concerns that Turco-Israeli relations would take a sharp turn for the 
worse and indeed they were severely damaged, still waiting to be repaired.  
Putting these developments together, it seemed Turkey had now 
become interested in pursuing an increasingly independent foreign policy. 
Challenging Americans and Israelis enhanced the public admiration for Prime 
Minister Erdoğan among Muslim populations in the Middle East, a 
phenomenon which he found gratifying. Turkey’s traditonal western Allies 
found Turkish behavior puzzling, the EU felt relief that Turkish attention was 
turning elsewhere while the Americans did not want a rupture since Turkish 
cooperation was still needed in insuring a smooth exit from Iraq.  
 
 
The Turning of the Tide: From Regional Leader to Regional Actor 
The outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring in the December of 2010 did not 
initially arouse major interest in Turkish foreign policy establishment. Turkey 
had limited relations with Tunisia though AKP had some linkages with the 
Islamic opposition movement in that country. Then came Tahrir Square. 
Again, while the government might be sympathetic to the demands for change 
and had relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, they kept their distance. 
Libya, however, constituted a turning point. Turkey had construction contracts 
totaling 25 billion USD there and more than 20000 citizens working in those 
projects. When Turkey’s western allies suggested that NATO should stage an 
intervention to stop bloodshed, the initial reaction of Prime Minister Erdoğan 
was to ask “What business does NATO have there?” When it became evident 
that France and Britain were going to intervene anyhow, Turkey affected a 
major turnaround, returned to the fold, and extended naval support to the 
operation and helped evacuate foreign nationals.  
 The developments in Libya demonstrated to Mr. Erdoğan and 
Davutoğlu that Turkey did not have the means to implement a regional policy 
and shape events by itself and that it had to make difficult choices. The decision 
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to take part in NATO operations was an earlier example. But it had already 
been preceded by another example in the November 2010 NATO summit when 
the US proposal to build and ABM radar system was adopted. Although no 
adversary against whom the system was designed was ever specified, it was 
understood that the primary target would be Iran and a subsidiary target 
Russia.  The missiles would not be deployed on Turkish territory, but a radar 
station needed to be built in Southeastern Turkey. Saying no to the proposal 
would cause a serious and may be an irreparable rift with NATO allies, 
especially the US. Saying yes, on the other hand, would be unwelcome by Iran 
and to a lesser degree by Russia.  
 
 
Syria: The Pivotal Case 
A rather difficult choice also emerged with regard to Syria. The Arab Spring 
reached Syria late. When demonstrations in various cities of Syria started, both 
the Turkish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister visited Bashar Assad to 
persuade him to accede rather than to stand against the tide demanding 
political reforms and liberalization. The Syrian president pretended to be 
accommodating, made promises for change but never delivered on his promises. 
This put the Turkish leadership in an embarrassing position since they had been 
trying to convince their allies to pursue moderation and engagement toward 
Syria. Prime Minister Erdoğan who values personal relationships highly, also 
felt personally betrayed and turned into an opponent of the Syrian leader.  
As the domestic strife in Syria continued, the Syrian government 
escalated the means it employed to include tanks, field guns and fighter-bomber 
jets to put the opposition down. The internal strife also produced a wave of 
refugees that flooded into Turkey. If hesitantly at first, Turkey joined its 
Western allies an in condemnation of the Syrian leadership conservative Arab 
regimes, becoming an active promoter of Syrian opposition. It has hosted 
meetings of the Friends of Syria that extends support to the opposition. It has 
allowed the political opposition to hold meetings in Istanbul. Newspapers have 
reported that light arms and ammunition as well as volunteers from other 
countries have transited through Turkey to make their way to the Syrian 
opposition forces. And most recently, it has been alleged that Turkey has been 
offering training to members of the Free Syrian Army whose headquarters are 
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located in the province of Hatay on the Syrian border. The Turkish Prime 
Minister has made it clear that Assad must go. Inadvertently, Turkey has 
become a party to Syrian domestic politics. 
Turkey’s increasing involvement in Syria in favor of the opposition has 
not been without its costs. To begin with, it has strained Turkey’s relations with 
Iran and Russia who are supportive of the current Syrian regime for different 
reasons. Russia, in trying to restore the power position that was once enjoyed 
by the Soviet Union, has had an interest in refurbishing the naval base in 
Tartus through which it can project its naval prowess to the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Whereas in earlier times, Soviets had a number of friends on the 
Eastern half of the Mediterranean including Libya and Egypt or even Cyprus, 
none of those are available now. Iran, on the other hand, tries to prevent the 
emergence of regimes to its West that are favorably disposed to the US and the 
western alliance. Furthermore, it desires to project its power toward the 
Mediterranean in which Syria constitutes a critical link. Of the two neighbors, 
Iran has been more open in its criticism of Turkey’s position on Syria and its 
increasingly pro-western disposition.   
A second negative outcome of the worsening relationship with Syria has 
been possible return of the support of the Syrian government to Kurdish 
terrorism of the PKK. Although the extent of such support is difficult to 
establish, particularly in light of the fact that the regime is fighting for its own 
life, the removal of controls by the Syrian government and its promotion of 
terror is a discomforting thought for Turkey. Turkish anxieties are further 
exacerbated by the takeover of some local governments by Kurdish groups in 
towns bordering Turkey. Though these towns are disparate and do not 
constitute a unified region, their assertions of autonomy, it is feared, would 
reinforce similar demands on the Turkish side of the border.  
A third problematical outcome has been the identification of Turkey as 
a pro-Sunni force in the region. A pro-Sunni designation clearly undermines 
Turkey’s claim to be equidistant to all parties in the region; a trusted partner, a 
mediator among rival parties and a builder of peace. This identification has 
been the outcome of Turkey’s close collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
in supporting the Syrian opposition to bring about the downfall of the Ba’athist 
Assad regime. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has denied the allegation vigorously 
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but other evidence also suggests that the Turkish government may in fact have 
introduced a sectarian filter to its policymaking in the region. For example, 
Tariq Hashimi, the Iraqi vice premier representing the Sunnis has escaped to 
Turkey after allegations by Prime Minister Maliki that he is involved in a plot 
to assassinate him. Turkey has not only refused to return Mr. Hashimi to Iraq 
but also given him asylum and the freedom to conduct political activity.  It is 
difficult to judge the truthfulness of the accusations against Mr. Hashimi in a 
society where politics is characterized by sectarian rivalries and where 
“unorthodox” methods of dealing with opponents are not uncommon. But it is 
understandable that extending liberties to a political fugitive is seen as taking 
the Sunni side in Iraqi politics.  
A fourth outcome is that the Syrian episode is that it has tested 
Turkey’s capabilities in its perceived new power position and shown its limits. 
It has become clear that Turkey by itself cannot play a determining role in the 
region or even in the fate of a neighbor such as Syria and has to work with allies 
and other regional forces. Additional evidence for this observation comes again 
from Iraq where Turkey’s efforts to cooperate with certain domestic forces in 
Iraq to bring down the government of  Nuri al-Maliki and replace it with Iyad 
Allawi have not just failed but made relations  with the current Iraqi 
government more problematical.  
Finally, the Syrian developments have had direct and indirect negative 
economic effects. Turkey’s trade with Syria has been reduced to a trickle. This is 
particularly hard on the economies of provinces that border Syria where the 
local economy had come to rely on trade with Syria including the purchasing 
power of large numbers of Syrian tourists. The negative economic effects have 
been reinforced by the fact that Syria is Turkey’s major truck route to eleven 
other countries further South, particularly in the Gülf. Alternative shipping 
routes exist but not only are they in need of development, but they also increase 
the costs of shipping significantly.  
 
 
 
Problems with Iraq and Iran and Israel 
The “Syrian Spring,” it has become evident, has had negative effects not only 
on Turkey’s relations with Syria but with other neighbors such as Iraq, Iran 
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and Russia. With Iraq and Iran, other problems have surfaced as well. In Iraq, 
as the ability of the Baghdad government to exercise authority over the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has waned, Turkey has begun to deal 
with the regional government in Erbil. Turkey feels that in bringing PKK 
terror under control, enlisting the cooperation of the KRG as opposed to that of 
Baghdad is more critical. In addition, Turkey has developed a lively trade with 
Northern Iraq that is rapidly expanding. Finally, as the government in 
Baghdad and the KRG fail to reach an agreement on how to share the oil and 
gas wealth of Northern Iraq, Turkey along with other major countries, have 
chosen to work with the KRG to develop these resources to the unhappiness of 
Baghdad which says that it will not recognize arrangements that have not 
obtained its approval.  
It has already been pointed out that the construction of an ABM radar 
base in southeastern Turkey has aroused Iran’s ire. In addition, regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program, the US has insisted that economic sanctions it has adopted be 
applied against Iran, indicating that the countries that violate these sanctions 
would be sanctioned by America. Within that context, Turkey has been asked 
to reduce the amount of oil it imports from Iran, a request that Turkey has had 
to accede to, however reluctantly. Nevertheless, mutual dependence constitutes 
an effective check against a significant rupture in relations. Turkey serves as 
Iran’s gateway to the West; Iran serves as one of Turkey’s gateways to Central 
Asia. Turkey gets Iranian natural gas for heating in its Eastern provinces, while 
Iran is a major export market for Turkey. In the confusing power structure of 
Iran, some government agencies make highly critical and even threatening 
remarks toward Turkey while others offer conciliatory remarks and extol the 
virtues of good relations. The competitive mood that characterizes the Turkish-
Iranian relationship, however, cannot be concealed in shroud of words. 
Recently, for example, the Turkish prime ministers announced that Turkey was 
working on the incorporation of long range missiles into its stockpiles, 
explaining that since other countries in the vicinity (i.e. Iran) were developing 
them, Turkey also ought to have its own.  
Turkish-Israeli relations continue to be cool. Despite intense pressure 
from the US, they have not improved. In fairness, this failure cannot be 
credited to the Turkish side alone. Some members of the Netanyahu coalition 
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have absolutely refused to accept responsibility for the death of nine persons on 
the Mavi Marmara, the boat raided by Israel on the high seas, and to offer 
Turkey an apology and indemnity to the families of the deceased, thereby tying 
the hands of the Netanyahu government to open the way toward improving 
relations.  Rather, Israel has turned to developing closer relations with Cyprus 
and Greece as a way of sidelining Turkey as a key friend in the region. The new 
friendship with Cyprus has now been cemented by the discovery of natural gas 
in the exclusive economic zone of Israel and in the Turkish-Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus contested zone of Cyprus. Israel has offered Cyprus to provide 
for the security of production and joint plans to develop a LNG plant on the 
island to ship the gas to world markets.  
 
 
From Zero Problems with Neighbors to Zero Neighbors without Problems? 
To conclude, what started out as a rise of Turkey to the level of the regional 
power has ended with Turkey as a regional actor, far from its aspirations of 
bringing about change in the global system of governance and building a zone 
of peace and prosperity under Turkey’s stewardship. While it is true that 
Turkey is an economically stronger country than before, that it now reaches 
corners of the world where it was not present before, partly the developments in 
the Middle East over which Turkey had little control and partly the choices of 
the Turkish political leadership, especially Mr. Erdoğan and Mr. Davutoğlu, 
Turkey now finds itself slowly being reduced to just one of the many actors in 
the region. Its initial moves to challenge the international system of governance 
have now been replaced by a reluctant return to the fold of the Western Bloc, 
especially the US. Yet the earlier experimentation that reflects overjudging 
Turkey’s enhanced capabilities and its failure to keep a neutral stance toward 
different countries of the region and different interpretation of religion, has 
done damage to Turkey’s international standing. Turkey is becoming identified 
more and more not as a part of the West bordering on the region, but as a part 
of the region itself. Turkey’s inability to solve its own domestic Kurdish 
problem not only reinforces this impression but also reduces Turkey’s capacity 
to project its power in the region.  
 
 
Ilter Turan  
 
 
 143 
 
Quo Vadis? 
The Turkish government had invested much prestige in changing the Assad 
government in Syria. If the Assad government survives against all odds, it will 
be taken as an indicator of Turkey’s impotence. For this reason, Turkey has 
been trying to persuade its allies that a more active intervention is needed 
against a brutal dictatorship. Russia and China are actively opposed to this. 
Western allies going through economically difficult times ( and in the US the 
presidential election is approaching), shy away from military engagements. 
Turkish public also seems not to support a Turkish military intervention in 
Syria. Nevertheless, Turkish military action against Syria should not be fully 
ruled out. Complaining that Turkey is having difficulty in accommodating tens 
of thousands of refugees, the Turkish foreign minister continues to insist that a 
security zone should be established within Syria itself. The only way that is 
possible is using military force.  
 The downfall of the Assad regime will not assure comfort either. Syria is 
a highly fragmented society where ethnic, tribal and religious cleavages run 
deep in society. It is feared that the country will go into a long lasting and 
bloody internal struggle that will have destabilizing effects on the neighboring 
countries, Turkey not excepted.  
 Turkish newspapers have turned more and more critical of Turkey’s 
foreign policy and the foreign minister Davutoğlu who is seen as its architect. 
Yet a major turnaround does not seem to be around the corner. There will be 
difficult days ahead. Sadly, the success of Turkey’s foreign policy has come to 
hinge upon what happens in Syria. It is certain that the makers of Turkish 
foreign policy did not intend to get themselves into this position, but this is 
where Turkey is now  
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ABSTRACT 
Turkey’s growing economy and the end of the Cold war have interjected a 
dynamism into Turkish foreign policy. It has meant reaching new countries and 
parts of the world as well as expanding and deepening existing ties. Three 
motivations appear to have guided Turkish foreign policy:  maintaining good 
relations with the traditional allies; affecting changes in the global system of 
governance favoring rising powers; and becoming a regional leader. During the 
2004-2010 period, Turkey has managed good relations with allies and advanced 
in regional leadership. Its efforts to bring change in the global system of 
governance through voting against sanctions for Iran have not proven 
successful. The Arab Spring has forced Turkey to work with its allies while the 
crisis in Syria and the way Turkey has become involved in the crisis has 
undermined Turkey’s claim to regional leadership and produced other 
undesirable outcomes. Turkey appears to be losing its status as a regional leader 
and becoming only a regional actor. 
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